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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981669-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
HOWARD LLOYD MILES, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for burglary, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973), and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1998). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
Deputy Collins did not act in bad faith when he failed to preserve blood samples. This 
Court reviews the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Holden, 964 
P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The issue on appeal is governed by the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and 
Utah Constitutions, the text of which are not at issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 18, 1997, defendant was charged with one count of burglary, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973), and criminal 
mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1998). 
A jury trial on these charges was begun on August 10, 1998. On the second day of 
trial, defendant raised the issue of the State's alleged failure to preserve evidence 
(R. 151:308). The court declined to put the trial on hold, allowing defendant to file a 
post-trial motion on the issue (R. 151:315). The jury trial proceeded to a guilty verdict 
(R.54). In a Memorandum Decision (R.116) (Appendix A) and accompanying 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.128) (Appendix B), the court denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant was sentenced to 0-5 years in prison, with 
the sentence suspended on completion of 3 months in jail and 36 months probation 
(R.114). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on December 10, 1997, Steve Winberg was clearing 
snow from the parking lot of a Reams grocery store at the 2300 block of Ft. Union 
Boulevard in Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 150:143). Winberg was preparing to spread 
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salt on the parking lot, and was standing in the back of his truck loading the Salter 
(R. 150:145). Defendant approached Winberg, walking up to within about ten feet and 
greeting him with "working hard?" Winberg responded, "yeah," and then watched as 
defendant walked away across the parking lot. Winberg was suspicious due to recent 
burglaries in the area, and followed him (R. 150:146-47). Defendant looked back at 
Winberg two or three times as he walked away, and then continued on across the street 
to an Einstein Bagels store (R. 150:149). Winberg watched while defendant broke out 
the drive-through window in the bagel store, and then climbed into the building 
(R. 150:149). 
Winberg called police on his cell phone, and continued watching the bagel store 
(150:152-3). Winberg then saw defendant leave the store and walk away. Winberg 
followed, speaking to the police dispatcher on his cell phone (150:156), and watched as 
police apprehended defendant (150:157). 
From the time that Winberg first saw defendant walking through the Reams 
grocery store parking lot until defendant's arrest, Winberg never lost sight of defendant 
except during the time defendant was inside the bagel store, when Winberg was able to 
see a single figure moving around inside the store (R. 150:160). In addition to 
Winberg, another witness also watched as defendant exited the bagel store. Starla 
Roque was parked outside the store while her husband was loading the newsstand at the 
bagel store, and saw defendant leave the store's storage room (R. 150:216). 
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When defendant was apprehended, the officers noted that the palms of his hands 
had small bleeding cuts, and the knuckles of his hands had recent abrasions 
(R. 150:234-35, 247-48, 269-70). The investigating officers found that the drive-
through window of the bagel store had been broken out (R: 150:246), and there were 
blood stains at various locations throughout the store, including the cash register 
drawer, the walls and floor around the broken window, and the inside of an unlocked 
storage room accessible only from the outside of the store (R. 150:250-51). 
In the course of investigating the burglary, an evidence technician was called in 
to preserve any available evidence. The technician, Officer John Bell, attempted to . 
collect blood samples from the inside of the store, but was uncertain whether the blood 
picked up by wiping the blood stains with a cotton swab would be sufficient to test 
(R. 151:293, 327-28). Bell gave these swabs to the lead investigating officer on the 
case, Scott Collins (R. 151:328), but there was a miscommunication between Bell and 
Collins as to whether the samples could be tested (R. 124,128). Officer Collins 
understood and believed that no testable samples had been collected, and did not submit 
any evidence to the lab (R.254). It is unknown what happened to the swabs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has the burden to prove that Officer Collins acted in bad faith in 
failing to preserve or test the blood on the swabs. A finding of bad faith in this context 
requires a showing that the officer actually knew that the evidence could have 
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exonerated defendant. There is no evidence which would suggest that Officer Collins 
believed anything other than that the blood on the swabs was insufficient for testing. 
For this reason, the trial court was correct in finding that Officer Collins did not act in 
bad faith by not preserving the swabs. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THAT OFFICER COLLINS DID NOT ACT IN BAD 
FAITH, AS DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROVING 
THAT COLLINS KNEW OF THE EXCULPATORY NATURE OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 858 (1982), Supreme Court held that a 
defendant must be given access to any known exculpatory evidence, and it is a violation 
of due process for the prosecution to suppress such evidence. In this appeal, defendant 
claims that Officer Collins' failure to preserve the swabs used in an attempt to collect a 
blood sample from the scene of the burglary violated this constitutional right of "access 
to evidence." Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988). 
However, there is no "undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to 
preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a 
particular prosecution." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Unless the exculpatory nature of 
evidence was "apparent before the evidence was destroyed," it is not "constitutionally 
material," and there is no due process violation arising out a police officer's failure to 
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preserve the evidence or make it available to the defendant. California v. Trombetta, 
467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); State v. Bakalov, No. 940523, slip op. at 18 (May 11, 
1999) ("'mere possibility' that undisclosed evidence might favor a defendant cannot 
establish a Brady violation") (quoting State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986)). 
In this case, defendant does not, and can not, argue that the blood evidence at 
issue was known to be exculpatory, since that evidence had not been tested in order to 
determine whether it was defendant's. Rather, this is a case in which "no more can be 
said than that it could have been subjected to tests," the results of which might have 
been exculpatory. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. In such a case, a defendant is required 
to prove that the failure to preserve the lost or destroyed evidence resulted from actual 
bad faith on the part of the police. 
We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police 
both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to 
reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interest of 
justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by 
their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Thus, if a defendant wishes to challenge an officer's 
failure to collect or preserve a particular piece of evidence, he has the burden of 
showing that the police officer's own actions prove that he was aware that the evidence 
was exculpatory, and that he destroyed it anyway. "We cannot simply presume that 
[lab tests] would yield results favorable to defendant. Rather, the exculpatory value of 
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untested or unavailable evidence 'must be apparent' before discovery is mandated by 
Brady." Bakalov, slip op at 18 {quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489); Youngblood, 488 
U.S. at 56 n.* ("The presence or absence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory 
value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed."). 
The State's reliance at trial on evidence concerning blood found in the store and 
on defendant's hands does not alter this analysis. In State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318 
(Utah App. 1998), police officers picked up trash bags from the curbside of defendant's 
house, and examined them for possible evidence of drug trafficking. The officers 
found various items of drug paraphernalia, and then disposed of the rest of the-trash. 
The defendant was relying on a defense that the trash which was picked up by the 
officers had been left in front of defendant's house by someone else, and argued that 
the officers had failed to preserve exculpatory evidence, since "the evidence in the trash 
bag was potentially useful to show that the bags were not Holden's bags or that Holden 
had not had control of them for some time." Holden, 964 P.2d at 323. The court held 
that defendant must come forward with evidence of bad faith on the part of the officers, 
and had failed in meeting this burden because there was no evidence that the officers 
were aware that the discarded trash contained any exculpatory evidence. Holden, 964 
P.2d at 324. 
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In this case, defendant makes a similar claim that the State used the evidence that 
blood was found at the scene of the burglary and on defendant's hands in order to 
convict him, but prevented him from testing the blood to show that it was not his. As 
in Holden, however, defendant in this case has failed meet his burden to prove that the 
officers acted in bad faith because there is no basis for finding that the officer 
understood that he was destroying exculpatory evidence. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 
56, n.* ("respondent has not shown that the police knew the semen samples would have 
exculpated him when they failed to perform certain tests or [preserve the evidence]"). 
Indeed, defendant failed to present to the trial court any meaningful evidence that 
Officer Collins believed the swabs were exculpatory. The only evidence cited by 
defendant as showing bad faith is (a) a dispute between the prosecutor and defense 
counsel as to whether certain police reports were provided to defense counsel prior to 
the start of the trial, (b) the trial testimony of Officer Collins in which he expressed his 
understanding that no testable blood evidence could be collected, (c) the conflicting 
testimony of Officer Bell, the evidence technician, as to whether the blood samples he 
collected were sufficient to test, and (d), an alleged violation by Collins of standard 
procedures for processing evidence. As discussed below, this evidence is irrelevant to 
the issue of Collins' bad faith. 
A. Alleged discovery violation. On the second day of trial, prior to the 
beginning of testimony, Officer Bell spoke with defense counsel and told her that he 
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had prepared a police report concerning his investigation at the bagel store 
(R. 151:287). Defense counsel asserted that she had not been given a copy of this 
report earlier. The prosecutor was unaware that defense counsel did not have the 
report, and stated that all of the reports had been copied and sent to defense counsel 
(R. 151:288). The trial court was not able to determine who was at fault for the 
problem, but rejected any conclusion that the prosecutor was trying to hide something. 
"It may have not gone over, it may have. Maybe it didn't get sent over inadvertently, 
maybe it got sent over and misplaced. There's — I try never to ascribe a reason that 
constitutes malice to something that can be explained by inadvertence equally well" 
(R.lSl^lO).1 
However, even if it is assumed that the prosecutor made an error in failing to 
provide the report, such does not have any relevance to the issue here, which is 
whether Officer Collins knew that the blood samples were exculpatory at the time he 
decided not to submit them for testing. There is no evidence that Collins personally 
hide the police report from defendant, or was in any way responsible for providing 
1
 Defendant does not claim in this appeal that he was harmed in the presentation 
of his case by the alleged discovery violation. The trial court allowed defense counsel 
whatever time necessary to prepare for her cross-examination of Bell in light of the 
report (R.290), and counsel made no request to recall Collins as a witness in order to 
cross-examine him further regarding the issues raised in Bell's report. 
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discovery to defendant. There is no logical connection between the alleged discovery 
violation and the issue of Collins' bad faith. 
B. Officer Collins' testimony. Defendant asserts that Collins was deliberately 
deceptive because he "left the impression" during his trial testimony that no blood 
samples were collected. However, there is no reason to believe that Collins was trying 
to mislead the court or hide the fact that the evidence technician had given him swabs 
with blood on them. 
First, defendant is unable to point to any false testimony. When asked whether 
any blood was collected, Collins accurately stated "not successfully where we felt it 
would have any evidentiary value." This assertion is consistent with his repeated 
statements that it was his understanding, a "collective opinion" based on those who 
were at the scene, that the blood on the swabs was inadequate to test. Collins' entire 
testimony is therefore consistent with his stated understanding that the blood could not 
be tested; if the blood on the swabs was not subject to testing, his conclusion that blood 
"samples" could not be gathered is accurate. 
Second, defendant argues that Collins' testimony was somehow calculated to 
conceal the fact that some blood had been collected, but this assertion is illogical in 
light of the facts. At the time of his testimony, Collins would have believed that 
defense counsel had read all the police reports and thus already knew that some blood 
had been collected at the scene and turned over to him. Bell stated in his report that he 
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"picked up some blood for possible future lab work, and turned it over to Deputy 
Collins" (R.303), and Collins would therefore have had no reason to believe that he 
would be able to hide the fact that "some blood" had been turned over to him. There is 
nothing in the record to imply that Collins knew that defense counsel did not have a 
copy of Bell's report or that defense counsel's ignorance of the report was other than 
inadvertent. None of the parties knew of this problem until the second day of trial. 
Accordingly, defendant's assertion that Collins was engaging in a "deliberate 
deception" simply makes no sense in this context.2 Collins' testimony does nothing 
other than consistently confirm his understanding that the swabs given to him by Bell 
were of no evidentiary value. 
Finally, even if it is assumed that Collins' testimony showed a desire to avoid 
questioning about the missing swabs, it would not be relevant to the court's finding of 
no bad faith: such a reading of the testimony would at worst only imply that Collins 
believed that he may have made a mistake in failing to submit the swabs so that the lab 
could determine whether they could be tested, thereby weakening the State's case by 
2
 There is, of course, nothing in the record to imply that the prosecutor 
intentionally withheld the report in order to prevent defense counsel from learning that 
blood samples had been taken, and then conspired with Collins to deny the existence of 
such samples. It would be poor planning to engage in such a tactic, but then to call the 
preparer of the withheld police report to the witness stand in order to disclose the 
existence of that report to the defense and testify as to the facts contained in it. 
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allowing defendant to argue that there was evidence out there that he failed to pursue.3 
The issue raised in this appeal is, however, not whether Collins made a mistake in 
believing that such samples could not be tested, or in negligently failing to submit them 
to the lab. The issue is only whether Collins believed that the swabs, if tested, would 
actually prove to be exculpatory. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. There can be no such 
implication from his testimony. 
C. Officer Bell's testimony. Officer Bell testified that he told Collins that he 
did not know whether the blood gathered on the swabs would be sufficient for testing, 
and that there was "a possibility" that a test could be run (R. 151:328). As the trial 
court noted, this testimony conflicts with Collins' statement that "the consensus was 
that the blood samples could not be analyzed and that they did not have any evidentiary 
value." Memorandum Decision, p.2-3 (R. 118-119). The trial court found that there 
was "an apparent miscommunication" between Collins and Bell (R.124). Defendant 
does not point to any evidence which would undermine the trial court's finding that 
there was a misunderstanding, and such appears to be the only reasonable explanation 
for the conflict in the testimony. 
3
 Indeed, defendant made this argument at trial, emphasizing the State's failure 
to test any of the blood evidence (R. 151:399-401). See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59 
(Stevens, J. concurring) ("it is unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced by the State's 
omission. In examining witnesses and in her summation, counsel impressed upon the 
jury the fact that the State failed to preserve the evidence and that the State could have 
conducted tests that might well have exonerated the defendant.") 
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The existence of this misunderstanding does not undermine the trial court's 
conclusion that Collins did not act in bad faith, nor does it in any way imply that 
Collins believed that the evidence was exculpatory. As the trial court noted, "Officer 
Collins testified that he did not recognize the blood samples as having any evidentiary 
value one way or the other" (R.125). Thus, even if it is assumed that Collins was 
wrong or negligent, in believing that the samples were insufficient to test, there is still 
nothing in the record to imply that Collins believed that the swabs would prove to be 
exculpatory if they had been submitted for testing.4 
D. Alleged deviation from normal practice. Defendant asserts that Collins 
violated "normal practices" in failing to submit the swabs for testing. However, there 
is no evidence in the record as to the existence of any "normal" practice or standard 
procedure on this issue. The only facts in the record are that Collins believed the 
swatches to contain an insufficient amount of blood for testing, and that he did not, in 
fact, submit them. There is no evidence of a standard procedure or practice established 
for deciding whether to submit a questionable sample for testing. Indeed, even if it is 
4
 Officer Collins' decision not to submit the blood samples for testing "can at 
worst be described as negligent." Memorandum Decision, p. 9 (R.124). See State v. 
Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 1998) ("Bad faith requires that a defendant 
prove more than mere negligence; a defendant must show that 'the police . . . by their 
conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.'"), 
quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 (no bad faith because officer's behavior in failing 
to preserve samples and perform tests was at worst negligent). 
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assumed that Collins believed that adequate blood samples existed, there is no evidence 
that there is a standard procedure which requires all such samples to be gathered, let 
alone that they must in all cases be tested. See Bakalov, slip op. at 18 ("due process 
. . . does not require that the State 'search for exculpatory evidence, conduct tests, or 
exhaustively pursue every angle on a case/") (quoting Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1306). 
Bell testified only that he thought there was a possibility that the blood on the 
swabs could have been tested, and that such a determination could be made by the lab. 
He did not testify that there was some policy requiring all samples to be tested, or that 
all blood swabs with unknown evidentiary value must be preserved. Indeed, Bell 
testified that it was Collins' decision whether to send the swabs for testing (R. 329). 
There is thus no evidence that Collins' failure to preserve the swabs constituted a 
knowing violation of standard procedures. 
Defendant has not met his burden to show that Officer Collins acted in bad faith. 
The trial court's conclusion to the contrary is fully supported by the record and did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ [ _ day of^ay, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
$^HX LAKE COUNTY 
L r\s 'DftputyCtorfc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD LLOYD MI2LES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 971922700 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on 
State's Destruction of Evidence. A hearing was held on this matter 
on September 18, 1998, at which time counsel for defendant and 
counsel for the State presented their respective positions. 
Following oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement 
to further consider the written submissions. Since having taken 
the defendant's Motion under advisement, the Court has had an 
opportunity to once again review the moving and responding legal 
Memoranda, and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On December 18, 1997, the defendant was charged by Information 
with burglary, £ third degree felony, and criminal mischief, a 
STATE V. MILES PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
class B misdemeanor. Following a jury trial held August 10 and 11, 
1998, the defendant was found guilty on both charges. 
At the trial, the State presented circumstantial evidence and 
eye-witness testimony that connected the defendant to a burglary 
that occurred at an Einstein's Bagel restaurant on December 10, 
1997. During the course of the trial, Officer John Bell testified 
that he was called to the scene of the burglary to process it for 
fingerprints and to collect blood samples. Officer Bell testified 
that he was able to obtain two blood samples; one collected near a 
small ledge under the cash register and one collected near the 
outside window of the restaurant. According to Officer Bell's 
testimony, he placed the two "swatches" of blood in a container and 
turned them over to Officer Scott Collins. Officer Bell testified 
that he did not know whether there was a sufficient amount of the 
blood samples for the State Crime Lab to perform tests on them, but 
that he left the decision of whether to actually take the samples 
to the Lab up to Officer Collins. 
Officer Collins testified that Officer Bell communicated his 
opinion that there was an insufficient amount of blood collected 
for any tests to be performed by the State Crime Lab. According to 
Officer Collins, the consensus was that the blood samples could not 
STATE V. MILES PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
be analyzed and that they did not have any evidentiary value. For 
this reason. Officer Collins apparently made the decision not to 
prserve the samples. 
LESA£ ANALYSIS 
In his Motion, the defendant argues that the State violated 
his due process right to access to material evidence when the 
police officers collected a blood sample from the scene of the 
crime and then discarded it. The State's position is that the 
blood samples were not constitutionally material and that even if 
they were, the defendant cannot present any evidence that the 
police acted in bad faith. 
The principle that the government is only required to preserve 
evidence in certain circumstances was first definitively addressed 
in California v, Trombetta/ 467 u.s. 479 (1984). in Trombetta, the 
defendants had been stopped for suspected drunken driving. Each 
defendant took a breathalyser test and registered higher than .10 
percent, an amount which carries a presumption of intoxication. 
Although feasible, the arresting officers failed to preserve 
samples of the defendants' breath. 
A unanimous Supreme Court declined to find a constitutional 
error in the state's failure to take and preserve samples. The 
Court held that the standard of fundamental fairness required by 
STATE V. MILES PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the Due Process Clause did "not require law enforcement agencies 
[to] preserve [evidence] in order to introduce the results of the 
tests" conducted on such evidence for three reasons. Id. at 941. 
First, the government did not destroy the evidence "in a 
calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements 
established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny"; rather, the 
police officers acted "in good faith and in accord with their 
normal practices." Id. at 488. 
Second, the evidence was not constitutionally material. 
According to the Court, materiality meant evidence which possessed 
"an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 
destroyed" and was of "such a nature that the defendant would be 
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available 
means." Id. at 4 89. On this point, the Court found that other 
methods of challenging the Intoxilyzer test results existed, 
including inspecting the machine and its records and introducing 
evidence of any outside influences, such as chemicals or radio 
waves, that could have affected the test. Id. at 490. 
Finally, the likelihood that the evidence would have been 
exculpatory had it been preserved was small. The Court noted that 
the possibility of error in the breath tests was "extremely low" 
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and found that the breath samples were more likely to be 
inculpatory rather than exculpatory* 
In Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. 51 (1988)/ defense counsel 
sought access to an assault kit and clothing to perform blood-group 
tests that might exonerate the defendant of charges of sexual 
assault. Id. at 54. Such tests proved impossible because the 
police had failed to store the samples properly. Id. at 53. 
Youngblood's principle defense was that the victim mistakenly 
identified him as the rapist/ and that the semen samples, if 
properly preserved, would have exonerated him. Id. The trial 
court proceeded, but instructed the jury that if it found that the 
state had destroyed or lost evidence, it should infer that the 
evidence would have been favorable to the defendant. Id. at 54. 
The Supreme Court broadened the test articulated in Trombetta, 
by holding that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on 
the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful 
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.'' Id. 
at 58. In so doingf the Court further explained that the mere 
possibility that evidence could exculpate a defendant/ had it been 
preserved, would not be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional 
materiality standard articulated in Trombetta. Instead, the 
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exculpatory value of the evidence must be apparent, and this 
apparency must be judged before the evidence is destroyed. 
Therefore, "the presence or absence of bad faith by the police for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the 
police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the 
time it was lost or destroyed." Id. at 56. 
The Supreme Court rejected Youngblood's argument that the 
mishandling of the samples deprived him of his due process rights, 
finding no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the police. The 
Court acknowledged that the likelihood of exoneration was higher 
than in Trombetta, but distinguished Trombetta by observing that 
the state's case in Youngblood did" not rely upon results from 
absent evidence, as was the case in Trombetta.1 The Court found 
that the "apparently exculpatory value" standard set forth in 
Trombetta was not satisfied, because no tests had yet been 
performed, and held that failure to preserve "potentially useful 
evidence" does not constitute a due process violation unless there 
is evidence of bad faith. Id. at 56. In reaching this holding, 
the Court expressed its unwillingness to speculate about the 
possible significance of the destroyed materials and was reluctant 
aYoungblood was convicted on the basis of a photographic 
lineup identification. 
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to "impose . . . an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain 
and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable 
evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution." Id. As for 
bad faith, the Court stated that "the presence or absence of bad 
faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must 
necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value 
of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed." Id. at 56-
57. 
The Court determines that the present case more closely 
resembles Youngblood then Trombetta. In Trombetta, the government 
failed to save breath samples after they had been tested. In 
Younablood, similar to the present case, the government failed to 
preserve samples so that definitive tests could not be performed. 
Also, in Trombetta, a subsequent test by the defendant merely 
provided impeachment evidence. On the other hand, in Youngblood, 
as in the present case, a test by the defendant, could it have been 
done, offered a possibility of exoneration. Therefore, the "bad 
faith" standard asserted in Younablood supplies the controlling Due 
Process standard. 
The "bad faith-' standard established in Youngblood was 
recently interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. 
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Hoi den. 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Holden, the 
defendant appealed the denial of two motions to suppress, one of 
which was based on the contention that the police acted in bad 
faith when they destroyed nonincriminating evidence from the search 
of the defendant's garbage bags. The defendant in Holden argued 
that the police acted in bad faith by failing to save "potentially 
useful" evidence from the trash because "the burden of preservation 
was minimal" and because the police acted too quickly in disposing 
of the trash without consulting supervisors or written police 
procedures. Id. at 21. 
In discussing the requirement of bad faith set forth in 
Youngblood, the court emphasized that "[b]ad faith requires that a 
defendant must show that *the police . . . by their conduct 
indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant.'" Id. at 20 (quoting Younablood, 488 U.S. at 58). The 
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion "in 
concluding that the police had not acted in bad faith in simply 
doing with the rest of his garbage what Holden intended would be 
done with it, i.e. disposing of it." Id. at 21• 
In this case, the "exculpatory nature" of the destroyed blood 
samples is at best a mere possibility. Under Younablood, this is 
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not enough to satisfy the constitutional materiality requirement 
articulated in Trombetta. Moreover, there exists no evidence of 
bad faith on the part of Officer Collins. In his Motion, the 
defendant seems to argue that a finding of bad faith is justified 
on the basis that Officer Collins' testimony is at odds with 
Officer Bell's testimony as to whether Officer Collins was informed 
that the blood samples were insufficient and could not be tested. 
The defendant's emphasis on whether Officer Collins discarded the 
blood samples because he thought they were insufficient is 
misplaced. Under Youngblood, the only relevant inquiry to the 
issue of whether Officer Collins acted in bad faith is whether 
Officer Collins knew of the exculpatory value of the blood samples 
at the time that he made the decision to not preserve the blood 
samples for analysis. The apparent miscommunication between the 
officers as to the sufficiency of the blood samples is immaterial 
to this inquiry. 
The Court finds that Officer Collins did not have knowledge of 
the exculpatory value of the blood samples at the time he discarded 
them because the blood had not been tested yet. While the failure 
of Officer Collins to take the blood samples to the State 
Laboratory for testing can at worst be described as negligent, 
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there is no suggestion that Officer Collins discarded the samples 
because he knew that they could form the basis for exonerating the 
defendant. In fact, Officer Collins testified that he did not 
recognize the blood samples as having any evidentiary value one way 
or the other. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion fails to satisfy 
the standards of Youngblood. 
During oral argument, counsel for the defendant argued that 
this case is analogous to State v. Cook, 953 P.2d 712 (Nev. 1998). 
In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed Cook's conviction 
because the State lost a number of critical pieces of evidence 
including photographs, a report prepared by a detective 
interviewing the defendant, a report of the victim's initial 
statement to police and the victim's sweater. While the court in 
Cook did not apply the Youngblood standard, the court essentially 
found that the police acted in bad faith by losing items that they 
could have "reasonably anticipated to be both material and 
exculpatory." Id. at 715. Cook is clearly distinguishable from 
the present case. Unlike the numerous items lost by the police 
officers in Cook, the blood samples that were discarded in this 
case did not meet the constitutional materiality requirement 
articulated in Trombetta. In addition, the police officers in this 
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case did not act in bad faith and could not have reasonably 
anticipated whether the blood samples would be material and 
exculpatory since the tests on the blood had not yet been 
performed. Accordingly, the Court determines that the defendant's 
reliance on Cook is misplaced. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court denies the 
defendant's Motion. Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to the 
Court for review and signature. 
Dated this^s^ day of September, ,£998. 
'IMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COU^T JUDGE 
STATE V. MILES PAGE TWELVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following, 
thi sP5~ day of September/ 1998: 
Rodwicke Ybarra 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rebecca Hyde 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Addendum B 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
Salt Lake District Attorney 
ERNEST W. JONES, Bar No. 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone:(801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HOWARD LLOYD MILES, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Case No. 971922700 FS 
Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on State's Destruction of Evidence in the above 
entitled matter came before this Court for hearing on September 18, 1998. Counsel for Defendant, 
Rebecca Hyde, Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, and counsel for the State, Ernest W. Jones, 
Deputy District Attorney, presented their respective positions. Following oral argument the matter 
was taken under advisement to further consider the written submissions. This Court now enters the 
following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The destroyed blood samples, at best, have only a mere possibility of being exculpatory 
in nature. 
2. There exists no evidence of bad faith on the part of Officer Collins. 
3. There was an apparent miscommunication between the officers as to the sufficiency of 
the blood samples. 
w. w» w ; ,J5t 
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4. Officer Collins did not have knowledge of the exculpatory value of the blood samples at 
the time he discarded them because the blood had not yet been tested. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The blood samples that were discarded in this case did not meet the constitutional 
materiality requirement articulated in California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). 
2. The government did not destroy the evidence "in a calculated effort to circumvent the 
disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny"; rather, the police 
officers acted "in good faith and in accord with their normal practices." Trombetta at 488. 
3. The apparent miscommunication between the officers as to the sufficiency of the 
blood samples is immaterial to this inquiry. 
4. The likelihood that the evidence would have been exculpatory had it been preserved 
was small, and therefore the "apparently exculpatory value" standard set forth in Trombetta was 
not satisfied. 
5. Because the present case deals with a government failure to preserve samples so that 
definitive tests could be performed, but does not deal with a failure to preserve samples after they 
have been tested, it more closely resembles Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), rather 
than Trombetta. Therefore, the bad faith standard asserted in Youngblood and recently 
interpreted in State v. Holden, 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), supplies the 
controlling Due Process standard. 
6. Because there is no suggestion that Officer Collins discarded the samples because he 
knew that they could form the basis for exonerating the defendant, and because he testified that 
2 
he did not recognize the blood samples as having any evidentiary value at all, the defendant's 
Motion fails to satisfy the "bad faith" standards of Youngblood. 
7. The defendant's reliance on State v. Cook, 953 P.2d 712 (Nev. 1998) is misplaced 
because that case involved numerous items lost by police which they "could reasonably [have] 
anticipated to be both material and exculpatory," whereas this case involves blood samples which 
do not meet the constitutionality requirement set forth in Trombetta. 
8. The destruction of the blood samples did not violate defendants right to Due Process. 
9. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is Denied. 
DATED this 
Approved as tO"fonp: 
4-day of October, 1998. 
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